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Abstract: The problem of Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). It describes some of the common 
cryptographic tools and constructs used in several PPDM techniques. The paper describes an overview of 
some of the well known PPDM algorithms, - ID3 for decision tree, association rule mining, EM clustering, 
frequency mining and Naïve Bayes. Most of these algorithms are usually a modification of a well known data 
mining algorithm along with some privacy preserving techniques. The paper finally describes the problem of 
using a model without knowing the model rules on context of passenger classification at the airlines security 
checkpoint by homeland security. This paper is intended to be a summary and a high level overview of 
PPDM. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Data mining refers to the techniques of extracting 
rules and patterns from data. It is also commonly 
known as KDD (Knowledge Discovery from Data). 
Traditional data mining operates on the data 
warehouse model of gathering all data into a central 
site and then running an algorithm against that 
warehouse. This model works well when the entire 
data is owned by a single custodian who generates 
and uses a data mining model without disclosing the 
results to any third party. However, in a lot of real 
life application of data mining, privacy concerns may 
prevent this approach. The first problem might be the 
fact that certain attributes of the data (SSN for 
example), or a combination of attributes might leak 
personal identifiable information. The second 
problem might be that the data is horizontally split 
across multiple custodians none of which is allowed 
to transfer data to the other site. The data might be 
vertically partitioned in which case, different 
custodians own different attributes of the data and 
they have the same sharing restrictions. Finally, the 
use of the data mining model might have restrictions, 
- some rules might be restricted, and some rules 
might lead to individual profiling in ways which are 
prohibited by law. 
Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) has emerged 
to address this issue. Most of the techniques for 
PPDM uses modified version of standard data mining 
algorithms, where the modifications usually using 
well known cryptographic techniques ensure the 
required privacy for the application for which the 
technique was designed. In most cases, the 
constraints for PPDM are preserving accuracy of the 
data and the generated models and the performance 
of the mining process while maintaining the privacy 
constraints. The several approaches used by PPDM 
can be summarized as below: 
1. The data is altered before delivering it to the data 
miner. 
2. The data is distributed between two or more sites, 
which cooperate using a semi-honest protocol to 
learn global data mining results without revealing 
any information about the data at their individual 
sites. 
3. While using a model to classify data, the 
classification results are only revealed to the 
designated party, who does not learn anything 
else other that the classification results, but can 
check for presence of certain rules without 
revealing the rules.  
In this paper, a high level overview of some of the 
commonly used tools and algorithms for PPDM is 
presented. 
II. SECURE MULTI PARTY 
COMMUNICATION 
Almost all PPDM techniques rely on secure multi 
party communication protocol. Secure multi party 
communication is defined as a computation protocol 
at the end of which no party involved knows anything 
else except it’s own inputs the results, i.e. the view of 
each party during the execution can be effectively 
simulated by the input and output of the party. In the 
late 1980s, work on secure multi party 
communication demonstrated that a wide class of 
functions can be computed securely under reasonable 
assumptions without involving a trusted third party. 
Secure multi party communication has generally 
concentrated on two models of security. The semi-
honest model assumes that each party follows the 
rule of the protocol, but is free to later use what it 
sees during execution of the protocol. The malicious 
model assumes that parties can arbitrarily cheat and 
such cheating will not compromise either security or 
 B. Govinda Lakshmi * et al. 
  (IJITR) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
  Volume No.4, Issue No.6, October – November 2016, 4397-4402.  
2320 –5547 @ 2013-2016 http://www.ijitr.com All rights Reserved.  Page | 4398 
the results, i.e. the results from the malicious party 
will be correct or the malicious party will be 
detected. Most of the PPDM techniques assume an 
intermediate model, - preserving privacy with non-
colluding parties. A malicious party may corrupt the 
results, but will not be able to learn the private data 
of other parties without colluding with another party. 
This is a reasonable assumption in most cases. 
In the next section I’ll present few efficient 
techniques for privacy preserving computations that 
can be used to support PPDM. 
Secure Sum 
Distributed data mining algorithms often calculate 
the sum of values from individual sites. Assuming 
three or more parties and no collusion, the following 
method securely computes such a sum.  
Let 
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And knowing R, it can compute the sum v. The 
method faces an obvious problem if sites collude. 
Sites (l-1) and (l+1) can compare their inputs and 
outputs to determine lv . The method can be extended 
to work for an honest majority. Each site divides lv
into shares. The sum of each share is computed 
individually. The path used is permuted for each 
share such that no site has the same neighbors twice.  
Secure Set Union 
Secure set union methods are useful in data mining 
where each party needs to give rules, frequent 
itemsets, etc without revealing the owner. This can be 
implemented efficiently using a commutative 
encryption technique. An encryption algorithm is 
commutative if given encryption keys
KKKK n ,...., 21 , the final encryption of a data 
M by applying all the keys is the same for any 
permuted order of the keys. The main idea is that 
every site encrypts its set and adds it to a global set. 
Then every site encrypts the items it hasn’t encrypted 
before. At the end of the iteration, the global set will 
contain items encrypted by every site. Since 
encryption technique chosen is commutative, the 
duplicates will encrypt to the same value and can be 
eliminated from the global set. Finally every site 
decrypts every item in the global set to get the final 
union of the individual sets. One addition is to 
permute the order of the items in the global set to 
prevent sites from tracking the source of an item. The 
only additional information each site learns in the 
case is the number of duplicates for each item, but 
they cannot find out what the item is. 
Secure Size of Set Intersection 
In this case, every party has their own set of items 
from a common domain. The problem is to securely 
compute the cardinality/size of the intersection of 
these sets. The solution to this is the same technique 
as the secure union using a commutative encryption 
algorithm. All k parties locally generate their public 
key-part for a commutative encryption scheme. The 
decryption key is never used in this protocol. Each 
party encrypts its items with its key and passes it 
along to the other parties. On receiving a set of 
encrypted items, a party encrypts each item and 
permutes the order before sending it to the next party. 
This is repeated until every item has been encrypted 
by every party. Since encryption is commutative, the 
resulting values from two different sets will be equal 
if and only if the original values were the same. At 
the end, we can count the number of values that are 
present in all of the encrypted item sets. This can be 
done by any party. None of the parties can find out 
which of the items are present in the intersection set 
because of the encryption. 
Scalar Product 
Scalar product is a powerful component technique 
and many data mining problems can be reduced to 
computing the scalar product of two vectors. Assume 
two parties P1 and P2 each have a vector of 
cardinality n, ),....,( 21 nxxxX  , 
),....,( 21 nyyyY  . The problem is to securely 
compute

n
i
ii yx
1
. There has been a lot of research 
and proposed solution to the 2 party cases, but these 
cannot be easily extended to the multi party case. The 
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key approach to a possible solution proposed in [3] is 
to use linear combinations of random numbers to 
disguise vector elements and then do some 
computations to remove the effect of these random 
numbers from the result.  Though this method does 
reveal more information than just the input and the 
result, it is efficient and suited for large data sizes, 
thus being useful for data mining. 
Oblivious Transfer 
The oblivious transfer protocol is a useful 
cryptographic tool involving two parties, - the sender 
and the receiver. The sender’s input is a pair 
),( 10 xx and the receiver’s input is a bit )1,0( . 
The protocol is such that the receiver learns x (and 
nothing else) and the sender learns nothing.  In the 
semi-honest adversaries, there exist simple and 
efficient protocols for oblivious transfer. 
Oblivious polynomial evaluation 
This is another useful cryptographic tool involving 
two parties. The sender’s input is a polynomial Q of 
degree k over some finite field F (k is public). The 
receiver’s input is an element Fz . The protocol is 
such that the receiver learns Q (z) without learning 
anything else about the polynomial and the sender 
learns nothing. 
In the next section, some common PPDM techniques 
are described: 
III. ANONYMIZING DATA SETS 
In many data mining scenarios, access to large 
amounts of personal data is essential for inferences to 
be drawn. One approach for preserving privacy in 
this case it to suppress some of the sensitive data 
values, as suggested in [5]. This is known as a k-
anonymity model which was proposed by Samarati 
and Sweeney. Suppose we have a table with n tuples 
and m attributes. Let k > 1 is an integer. We wish to 
release a modified version of this table, where we can 
suppress the values of certain cells in the table. The 
objective is to minimize the number of cells 
suppressed while ensuring that for each tuple in the 
modified table there are k-1 other tuples in the 
modified table identical to it. 
The problem of finding optimized k-anonymized 
table for any given table instance can be shown to be 
NP-hard even for binary attributes. There are 
however O(k) approximation algorithm discussed in 
[5] for solving this problem. The algorithm is also 
proven to terminate. 
 
IV. DECISION TREE MINING 
In the paper [4], a privacy preserving version of the 
popular ID3 decision tree algorithm is described. The 
scenario described is where two parties with database 
D1 and D2 wish to apply the decision tree algorithm 
on the joint database D1 U D2 without revealing any 
unnecessary information about their database. The 
technique described uses secure multi party 
computation under the semi honest adversary model 
and attempts to reduce the number of bits 
communicated between the two parties. 
The traditional ID3 algorithm computes a decision 
tree by choosing at each tree level the best attribute to 
split on at that level ad thus partition the data. The 
tree building is complete when the data in uniquely 
partitioned into a single class value or there are no 
attributes to split on. The selection of best attribute 
uses information gain theory and selects the attribute 
that minimizes the entropy of the partitions and thus 
maximizes the information gain. 
In the PPDM scenario, the information gain for every 
attribute has to be computed jointly over all the 
database instances without divulging individual site 
data. We can show that this problem reduces to 
privately computing x ln x in a protocol which 
receives x1 and x2 as input where x1 + x2 = x. This is 
described in [4].  
V. ASSOCIATION RULE MINING 
We describe the privacy preserving association rule 
mining technique for a horizontally partitioned data 
set across multiple sites. Let I = },....,{ 21 niii be a set 
of items and T = },....,{ 21 nTTT be a set of 
transactions where each ITi  . A transaction iT
contains an item set IX   only if iTX  . An 
association rule implication is of the form YX  (
0YX ) with support s and confidence c if s% 
of the transactions in T contains YX  and c% of 
transactions that contain X also contain Y. In a 
horizontally partitioned database, the transactions are 
distributed among n sites. The global support count 
of an item set is the sum of all local support counts. 
The global confidence of a rule can be expressed in 
terms of the global support: 



n
i
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1
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
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The aim of the privacy preserving association rule 
mining is to find all rules with global support and 
global confidence higher than the user specified 
minimum support and confidence. The following 
steps, utilizing the secure sum and secure set union 
methods described earlier are used. The basis of the 
algorithm is the apriori algorithm which uses the (k-
1) sized frequent item sets to generate the k sized 
frequent item sets. The problem of generating size 1 
item sets can be easily done with secure computation 
on the multiple sites. 
 Candidate Set Generation: Intersect the globally 
frequent item set of size (k-1) with locally 
frequent (k-1) itemset to get candidates. From 
these, use the Apiori algorithm to get the 
candidate k itemsets. 
 Local Pruning: For each X in the local candidate 
set, scan the local database to compute the 
support of X. If X is locally frequent, it’s included 
in the locally frequent itemset. 
 Itemset Exchange: Compute a secure union of the 
large itemsets over all sites. 
 Support Count: Compute a secure sum of the 
local supports to get the global support. 
VI. EM CLUSTERING 
Clustering is the technique of grouping data into 
groups called “clusters” based on the value of the 
attributes. A well known algorithm for clustering is 
the EM algorithm which works well for both discrete 
and continuous attributes. A privacy preserving 
version of the algorithm in the multi site case with 
horizontally partitioned data is described below. 
Let us assume that the data is one dimensional (single 
attribute y) and are partitioned across s sites. Each 
site has nl data items ( 


s
l
lnn
1
). Let 
)(t
ijz denote 
the cluster membership for the ith cluster for the jth 
data point at the (t)th EM round. In the E step, the 
values i (mean for cluster i), 
2
i  (variance for 
cluster i) and i (Estimate of proportion of items i) 
are computed using the following sum: 
 
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The second part of the summation in all these cases is 
local to every site. It’s easy to see that sharing this 
value does not reveal iy  to the other sites. It’s also 
not necessary to share nl, and the inner summation 
values, but just computing n and the global 
summation for the values above using the secure sum 
technique described earlier. 
In the M step, the z values can be partitioned and 
computed locally given the global i , 
2
i and i . 
This also does not involve any data sharing across 
sites. 
VII. FREQUENCY MINING 
The basic frequency mining problem can be 
described as follows. There are n customers 
nUUU ,...., 21 and each customer has a Boolean 
value id . The problem is to find out the total number 
of 1s and 0s without knowing the customer values i.e. 
computing the sum 

n
i
id
1
without revealing each id . 
We cannot use the secure sum protocol because of 
the following restrictions.  
 Each customer can send only one flow of 
communication to the miner and then there’s no 
further interaction.  
 The customers never communicate between 
themselves.  
The technique presented in [8] uses the additively 
homomorphic property of a variant of the ElGamal 
encryption. This is described below: 
Let G be a group in which discrete logarithm is hard 
and let g be a generator in G. Each customer iU has 
two pairs of private/public key pair ),( i
x
ii gXx   
and ),( i
y
ii gYy  . The sum 


n
i
iXX
1
and



n
i
iYY
1
, along with G and the generator g is 
known to everyone.  Each customer sends to the 
miner the two values ii
yd
i Xgm . and
ix
i Yh  . 
The miner computes 


n
i i
i
h
m
r
1
. For the value of d 
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for which rg
d  , we can show that this represents 
the sum

n
i
id
1
. Since 0 < d < n, this is easy to find 
by encrypt and compare. We can also that assuming 
all the keys are distributed properly when the 
protocol starts, the protocol for mining frequency 
protects each honest customer’s privacy against the 
miner and up to (n-2) corrupted customers. 
VIII. NAÏVE BAYES CLASSIFIER 
Naïve Bayes classifiers have been used in many 
practical applications. They greatly simplify the 
learning task by assuming that the attributes the 
independent given the class. They have been used 
successfully in text classification and medical 
diagnosis.  
Naïve Bayes classification problem can be 
formulated as follows. Let mAAA ,....,1 be m 
attributes and V be the class attribute. Let each 
attribute iA have a domain },...,,{
21 d
iii aaa and 
class attribute V has a domain },...,,{ 21 dvvv . The 
data point for the classifier looks like
),....,( ,21 jjmjj vaaa . Given a new instance
),....,( ,21 jmjj aaa , the most likely class can be 
found using the equation: 



m
i
l
i
l
Vv
vaPvPv
l
1
)|()(maxarg  
This can be written is terms on number of occurrence 
# as: 

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m
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l
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vv
l
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)(#maxarg  
The goal of the Privacy Preserving Naïve Bayes 
learner is to learn the Naïve Bayes classifier 
accurately, but the miner learns nothing about each 
customer’s sensitive data except the knowledge 
derived from the classifier itself.  To learn the 
classifier, all the miner needs to do is to learn )(#
lv  
and ),(#
l
i va  for each i, each k and each l. Since the 
occurrence of 
lv  or the pair ),(
l
i va can be denoted 
by a Boolean value, we can use the technique 
described in Frequency Mining to compute the Naïve 
Bayes model with the privacy constraints. 
 
IX. USING A MODEL WITHOUT 
DISCLOSING THE MODEL. 
Recent homeland security measures uses data mining 
models to classify each airline passenger with a 
security tag. The problem statement comes from 
following requirements for the system: 
 No one learns of the classification result other 
than the designated party. 
 No information other than the classification result 
will be revealed to the designated party. 
 Rules used for classification can be checked for 
certain condition without revealing the rules. 
The problem can be formally stated as follows. Given 
an instance x from site D with v attributes, we want 
to classify x according to rule set R provided by site 
G. The rules Rr are of the form )(
1
CL
v
i
i 

 , 
where each iL is wither a clause axi  , or don’t 
care (always true). Using the don’t care clause, G can 
create arbitrary size rules and mask the actual number 
of clauses in the rule. In addition, D has a set of rules 
F that are not allows to be used for classification. The 
protocol will satisfy the following conditions: 
 D will not be able to learn any rules in R 
 D will be convinced that  0RF  
 G will only learn the class value of x 
The approach suggested in [2] uses a un-trusted non 
colluding site, where the only trust placed on the site 
is that it’ll not collude with any of the other sites to 
violate privacy.  Both G and D send synchronized 
streams of encrypted data and rule clause to site C. 
The orders of the attributes are scrambled in a way 
known to D and G only. Each attribute is given two 
values, - one corresponding to don’t care and another 
it’s true value. Each clause also has two values for 
every attribute. One is an “invalid” value to mask the 
real value and the other is the actual clause value or 
the “don’t care” value. Site C compares both the 
values to see if the first or the second match. If yes, 
then either the attribute is a match or it’s a “don’t 
care”. If there’s a match for every clause in the rule, 
then the rule is true. To check for  0RF , 
commutative encryption technique is used and C 
compares the double encrypted version of the sets. 
X. CONCLUSION 
As usage of data mining for potential intrusive 
purposes using personally identifiable information 
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increases, privately using these results will become 
more important. The above algorithm techniques 
show that it’s possible to ensure privacy without 
compromising accuracy of results, and has a bound 
on the computation and the communication cost.  
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